Russia may abandon Iran

According to the site, “far from the battlefield, their bilateral relations have expanded through multiple fields. In 2016, Russia recently handed over the long-awaited S-300 missile defense system to Iran, and even Moscow played the role of mediator between Tehran and Riyadh in OPEC negotiations. As a result, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia declined to link its oil production cuts to parallel cuts by Iran. But despite the increasing cooperation, tensions remained. Disagreements appeared regarding the division of reconstruction contracts after the war in Syria, where the two sides competed for a greater share of economic spoils. Iran has also sought advanced weapons, including Su-35 combat aircraft, but Russia has repeatedly overlooking this demand. However, the relationship between the two parties continued, but at this stage, Russia maintained the upper hand, and its air forces played the decisive role in Syria, and Moscow remained the dominant military and economic power.

The website continued, “But this balance began to turn in 2022 with the full Russian invasion of Ukraine. The war has radically changed the Russian -Iranian relations. As the conflict continues, Russia has found itself is increasingly isolated, burdened with international sanctions, and is not militarily ready to fight a long -term battle. In light of its despair of military support, but the restrictions imposed by the West, Moscow resorted to Tehran. Iran’s support for Russia was not only driven by financial incentives. More importantly, it reflects Tehran’s strategic ambition to reset the dynamics of power in their unequal relationship. For decades, Russia dictated the conditions, taking advantage of its economic and military superiority. By providing Moscow with decisive military origins, Iran has sought to gain influence and establish itself as an indispensable partner. This strategy began to bear fruit, as Russia launched the Iranian military satellite “Khayyam”, which indicates the deepening of technological cooperation.

The site added, “But Iran’s newly discovered influence had clear borders. Russia continued to block advanced aircraft, and during the confrontations between Iran and Israel in April and October 2024, Moscow has refrained from providing purposeful support to Tehran. This has emphasized the restrictions imposed on their partnership. However, it is clear that the Russian -Iranian relations were formed through the war in Ukraine and their mutual efforts to preserve the Assad regime in Syria. Now the question arises: What will happen to this relationship in the absence of Assad and with the increasing possibility of a ceasefire or a peace agreement in Ukraine? ”

According to the site, “The collapse of the Assad regime created a growing void in Russian -Iranian relations. First, their basic joint military endeavor ended in cooperation in Syria. Second, in the absence of a joint vision of the threat in Syria, their intertwined interests in the Middle East diminish. In addition, the end of the war in Ukraine would cancel the temporary Iranian influence over Russia. Without war, Iran’s strategic importance will decrease for Moscow. Simply put, as soon as Russia no longer needs drones and Iranian military support, there will be a lot that Tehran can provide to meet the immediate needs of Russia. This shift would restore balance in their relationship, and put Russia again in a dominant position.

The site continued, “Moreover, it is very likely that Russia, in an attempt to secure an adequate ceasefire or a peace agreement in Ukraine, and rebuild relations with the United States, will seek to reduce tensions in other areas of disagreement with Washington. With the departure of Assad and the end of the war in Ukraine, Russia will have less strategic reasons to maintain close relations with Tehran, making Iran a possible candidate for diplomatic marginalization. In addition to seeking to achieve reconciliation with the United States, Russia will have other incentives to distance itself from Iran in the post -Assad and post -Ukraine war. One of the main factors is its relationship with Israel, the partnership that Moscow has constantly sought to preserve and expand it.

The site added, “There is another decisive factor represented in the changing geopolitical scene in the Persian Gulf. With President Trump’s administration revived the campaign of “maximum pressure” against Iran, the Arab Gulf states, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are likely to ally more closely with the United States against Tehran or at least feel pressure to do so. This transformation may be a major challenge for Iran. As President Trump returns to the maximum pressure campaign, Tehran will urgently need Russian diplomatic support to the United Nations to prevent decisions and veto sanctions. In addition, Iran will rely on Russian military support to rebuild its strong air defense capabilities. Moreover, Iran is likely to look to Russia, at least somewhat, to help it maintain its influence in Syria, given that Moscow has so far succeeded in keeping some of its forces stationed there. However, the future remains uncertain, and these factors would put Tehran under great pressure.

The site concluded, “The end of the war in Ukraine may offer some advantages to Iran. If the conflict ends and the US sanctions are lifted from Russia, Moscow will restore the ability to reach a large part of the global energy market. This would reduce economic pressure on Russia and reduce its need to sell oil at very reduced prices to the Asian market, especially to India and China, where it was directly competed with Iran. As a result of this, Tehran may restore part of its lost share in the market, but due to the possibility of Washington imposing another wave of sanctions on Iran, Tehran may have to provide reduced prices to maintain its energy exports.