What not everyone knows about the Syrian Air Force: many facts

The Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed website published a new report under the title: “The Syrian Air Force… what Israel destroyed and what remains,” which stated:

Although Israel said that it destroyed about 80% of the Syrian army’s capabilities, especially during the recent strikes that followed the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, focusing on the capabilities of the Syrian Air Force, it appears that it still has targets in Syria.

The latest Israeli strikes on Syria took place last Wednesday without revealing the losses they caused, while on Thursday, January 2nd, air strikes targeted defense factories in the Al-Safira area in the Aleppo countryside, northwest of the country, and destroyed warehouses for surface-to-surface missiles of the “type” model. Scud, which means that Israel may have finished its most important goals in Syria, which is the infrastructure and superstructure of the Syrian Air Force, which can be said to be almost completely out of service, with the exception of some helicopters. Old.

“Arrow of Bashan”

The Israeli occupation launched Operation “Arrow of Bashan,” during which aviation destroyed about 80% of Syrian strategic military capabilities, such as planes, helicopters, tanks, and warships, and its forces also took control of important strategic sites.

This came in conjunction with. Occupation Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu collapsed the separation of forces agreement signed in 1974, which maintained understandings with the Assad family regime for five decades.

Israel justified its operation by saying that it feared that these military capabilities would reach the opposition forces, whose directions were not yet known, with indications from within Israeli corridors that this happened after plans were prepared in advance, through collecting intelligence information over decades, but the pace of events required rapid adjustments and changes. .

The Israeli army admitted to destroying squadrons of fighter planes and bombers at several Syrian military airports. It also said that most of the attacks led to severe damage to the Syrian air defense system and the destruction of more than 90% of the strategic surface-to-air missiles whose locations were identified, which means that the Air Force The Syrian is now outside the scope of the military equation in the region.

Distribution of the Syrian Air Force

In an investigation by Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, with the help of military researchers, including defectors from the Syrian Air Force, it was found that the Air Forces in the Syrian Army constitute a percentage of up to 20% of the total general army forces, and are distributed according to the following organizational hierarchy: Air Force Command, which includes the headquarters. The Unified Central Headquarters in the Qasioun area, the Northern Unified Headquarters in Shinshar, Homs, “M2,” and the Southern Unified Headquarters, “M1,” to which the 20th Air Division is affiliated. It has the following airports: Mezzeh “Brigade 86”, Dumayr “Brigade 30”, Marj Al-Sultan and Aqraba under the name “Brigade 59 Helicopters”, Bali in Suwayda, Al-Sin “Brigade 17”, Nasiriyah, Khalkhala “Brigade 73 Air”, and Brigade 29 Transport. Air near Damascus International Airport.

In addition to these headquarters, the Northern Unified Headquarters “M2” is affiliated with the 22nd Air Division, and the Shayrat airports are affiliated with the 50th Air Brigade, T4 70th Air Brigade, and Hama 63rd Brigade.

The army also possessed electronic insurance brigades, “aviation radars,” while the independent brigades were Hmeimim Airport, and the 24th Brigade, consisting of Deir ez-Zor and Tabqa airports under the name Bassam Hamsho Barracks, Palmyra Airport, and Qamishli Airport.

There are also training airports affiliated with the Air College, which include the Air College, Abu Al-Duhur, and Ming, the Air Technical School for training non-commissioned officer cadres, and Factory 419 “Nayrab Airport,” which contains lines for maintaining all combat aircraft and helicopters used in the former regime’s army, in addition to an airport. Al-Jarrah Airport, or what is known as Keshish Airport, and Taftanaz Helicopter Airport. In addition to all of this, there are airports that have been suspended in favor of military air operations, such as Al-Dimas Airport and Al-Dabaa Airport in Homs, and the agricultural airports in Izraa in Daraa and Al-Hamdan in the city of Al-Bukamal in Deir ez-Zor, which are operationally affiliated with the Air Force Administration.

As for the organizational structure of the Air Defense Forces, it was composed of the following: a long-range mobile missile regiment “S-300”, a hastily mobile missile regiment that included “Pantsir” and “Buk”, four long-range missile regiments “S-200”, and short-range missile brigades. They are 8 “Osa” type and two “Kvadrat” (Soviet) type, and the 24th mixed air defense division, which is affiliated with 4 23-57 mm artillery regiments, each regiment consisting of 12 to 14 m/t (anti-aircraft) artillery companies, and 4 mixed brigades of the “Pechora-Volga” systems. There is the 26th mixed air defense division, and it has 4 23-57 mm artillery regiments, and each regiment is composed of 12 to 14 m/m artillery companies, and 4 mixed “Pechora-Volga” brigades.

After the fall of the regime on December 8, 2024, Israel launched more than 352 air strikes, destroying the most important military air and air defense sites and air force ammunition depots, such as Al-Salamiyah depots that contained these ammunitions, according to a source for Al-Araby Al-Jadeed.

The strikes included Syrian airports, aircraft squadrons, aviation radars and air defense systems, putting them all out of service. Also, Israel announced that it had destroyed the strategic capabilities of the Syrian military force. According to the source, the destruction of the Syrian army’s arsenal by Israel, especially with regard to air power and air defense, was carried out with Russian approval.

In turn, the military researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies and the officer who defected from the regime forces, Rashid Hourani, said in an interview with Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that the Syrian Air Force basically suffers from a major weakness in terms of technology and training.

He pointed out that it is extremely difficult after the Israeli strikes, which followed the fall of the regime, to restart the air force, because it needs an air defense system to secure its aviation before take-off, and it is not currently available due to the targeting of the northern central unified headquarters in Shinshar 2, which directs the aviation and works. In integration with the Unified Headquarters 1 in Qasioun.

Added to the weakness of the technical aspect of the Syrian air capabilities, according to Hourani, is the failure to increase the experience and competence of its pilots by following training courses in the relevant Russian military academies and colleges since before 2011 because Russia rejected this, for reasons including political reasons related to ensuring Israel’s security. Because, in return, it provided the regime with air defense weapons, which are considered defensive and not offensive, in addition to economic reasons related to its debts to Syria, and the latter’s failure to pay these debts.

Hourani revealed that the Syrian Air Force was exposed to many technical accidents before 2011. He presented a proposal to study the causes of these accidents to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, whether they were due to reasons related to the psychological aspect of the pilots and their impact on their performance, and the proposal was rejected.

This matter was clearly explained after 2011 by the regime’s reliance on helicopters, loading them with barrels and dropping them in a primitive manner.

In turn, Colonel Pilot Ismail Ayoub told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that the Syrian Air Force did not have air superiority and control capabilities due to the age of the aircraft, most of which were either expired (in terms of flight hours or age) or lacked readiness, as they were old and lacked spare parts. To operate it optimally.

Ayoub listed the squadrons deployed at the airports, whether for fighters or helicopters, as consisting of the following models: Sukhoi 24, Sukhoi 22, MiG 21, 23, 29, and Czechoslovakian training MiG 29, which were also used in air sorties, in addition to squadrons of Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters. The Mi-25, the French Gazelle, and a squadron of naval helicopters.

Ayoub explained, “The MiG-21 planes are no longer used by even the country that manufactured them, Russia. It coordinated (removed them from service) all of them, and we, as pilots, did not know how they flew in the air.

As for the newest or most ready aircraft in the Syrian Air Force, they were the Sukhoi 24, and they are also, compared to the development of air forces in the world, considered old, heavy, and unable to maneuver optimally.”

Regarding the strikes directed by Israel against the Syrian Air Force at airports, Ayoub indicated that there is no accurate count of what Israel targeted, but he expected that the strikes destroyed the remaining aircraft and infrastructure of the air force and air defense. He also expressed his belief that there are stored aircraft that were not targeted by strikes, especially training ones, but those aircraft most likely lack readiness, according to him, and preparing them requires technical operations, maintenance and spare parts.

It is noteworthy that the Syrian Air Force relies on Eastern, i.e. Russian, armament for most types of military aviation and helicopters, in addition to Czechoslovakian training aircraft, with some French helicopters. This type of weapon is characterized by size and heaviness without quality, technology, efficiency, and thus accuracy.

Regarding the possibility of building the Syrian Air Force again, Ayoub pointed out that “this is related to the political circumstances and the direction of the Syrian government, and whether there is an international consensus on selling aircraft and an air force to the Syrian state in the future.”