The struggle of wills on the outskirts of the explosion

The visit of the deputy of the American envoy Morgan Ortagus to Beirut is not a passing protocol visit, but rather with sharp messages and American demands that go beyond the limits of political advice to what looks like dictates. At the head of these demands, the disarmament of Hezbollah, the most sensitive and complex issue in the Lebanese scene, comes, especially in light of the internal alignments and the sharp regional and international division.

The American administration is seeking again to impose a new equation in Lebanon based on the dismantling of the elements of the force that, in its view, is a threat to its interests and the interests of its allies in the region. But Washington every time it collides with the wall of the Lebanese reality; Deficient balances, sectarian complications and rooted resistance are no longer merely a weapon, but rather turned into a part of the collective awareness of a wide segment of the Lebanese.

Perhaps the official Lebanese position swings between desire and impotence towards the issue of disarmament of Hezbollah; The desire to satisfy the international community and maintain internal stability at the same time. The government, whatever its real position, realizes that imposing this reality at this time means opening the doors of hell on the Lebanese interior. On the other hand, “Baabda” presents the idea of ​​the defensive strategy as an entrance to the dialogue, but this offering remains until the moment merely a loose title without a real content, for reasons related to the Lebanese internal context, as the absence of a comprehensive national consensus on the role of the resistance and its weapon in Lebanon and the root division between the political forces, some of which consider that the weapon of Hezbollah is a source A threat to the sovereignty of the state, makes the introduction of the defense strategy file closer to political luxury or escaping forward.

For his part, Hezbollah realizes that what is required of it today is not merely abandoning its weapon, but also abandoning its role and location in the Lebanese and regional equation. Therefore, his position is settled and clear; Do not neglect weapons or bargaining on the resistance site. As the “party” considers that talking about disarmament in light of the continued occupation of Lebanese lands and daily Israeli violations is a proposal that is not in line with reality, but rather is closer to political surrender. Consequently, any attempt to impose this option by force will face it with a categorical rejection, and perhaps with a serious resistance if necessary, which warns of the transformation of Lebanon into an internal battlefield.

Today, there are concerns among some local powers that political pressures turn into an internal clash that is intended to create a new reality by force. However, this possibility, as dangerous, does not seem imminent in the short term, neither the internal environment is ready for a civil battle, nor the international community is ready for this adventure in Lebanon in light of its preoccupation with major files. Therefore, it is likely to continue political and financial pressures, and perhaps more attempts to restrict the resistance and strangle it economically and popularly, but without going to the option of direct confrontation at least at this stage.

In light of the high frequency of talking about the disarmament of Hezbollah by force, a basic question is raised about the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding these pressures, and whether it will be simply delivered to the decision to strip Hezbollah in its entire power. In response to this question, he answers this question that Iran sees in the “party” an advanced strategic ally in the arenas of confrontation, so it is not expected that Tehran will give up its support for the party, because this means dismantling one of the most important pillars of its strength, which is, according to previous experiences, has proven its willingness to all prices as long as it does not affect the essence of its regional project.

Lebanon today stands at a dangerous junction between the will of the outside, which touches its doors strongly, and the inside of the interior, which cannot be jumped over it without a heavy cost. And between this and that, the resistance remains with its weapon and its speech, an essential part of the scene that cannot be overcome, neither by entiring nor by intimidation. As for the Lebanese scene, it remains hostage to the “game of nations”, which has become more than the boundaries of geography and almost swallow the remaining sovereignty of a homeland between threat and anticipation.