Trump’s return to the maximum pressure on Iran is failing

“With Iran’s celebration of the forty -sixth anniversary of its Islamic revolution on the eleventh of February, tensions with the United States escalated again. US President Donald Trump re -ignited the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran last Thursday with the signing of a new presidential note that tightens sanctions against Tehran, and in particular targeting oil exports. Although he claims to be “torn” over this step and expressed his preference to reach an agreement instead It is “Iran’s bombing”, but it was its previous administration that withdrew from one side of the Iranian nuclear agreement, which led to the undermining of The negotiations that he now prefers to prefer. At the same time, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the negotiations and described them as “not rational, smart or honorable.” The foregoing does not leave any doubt that the confrontation is still far from the end. ”

According to the site, this renewed “maximum” policy of “maximum pressure” is based on an increasing perception that Iran’s weaknesses were never greater than they are now. He persuaded the fall of Bashar al -Assad’s regime in Syria, beheading the Hezbollah leadership, and the escalation of public discontent within Iran many that the Islamic Republic became in its last days. For supporters of a more aggressive policy, it is time to address the Iranian threat on all fronts, and this would include the formation of an anti -resistance alliance by deepening Arab -Israeli partnerships under Ibrahim’s agreements and intensifying heavy sanctions to isolate Tehran. Indeed, the maximum pressure policy has been based on two assumptions: First, that economic sanctions impose little costs on the United States, and secondly, that the sanctions alone will inevitably ignite internal disturbances capable of overthrowing the regime or forcing it to change its policy. What increases these errors is that the campaign does not make any meaningful incentives, leaving Tehran with little reasons for negotiation. In practice, these assumptions have been proven wrong.
Penalties costs
According to the site, “In contrast to Washington’s expectations, the maximum pressure was expensive for the United States. Instead of curbing the Iranian nuclear program, the increase in sanctions led by six times and a half to turn Iran into a state on a nuclear threshold. Iran raised the enrichment of uranium from 3.5 percent under the joint comprehensive action plan to more than 60 percent, and its stock of enriched uranium increased from 200 kg to 6604 kg, and its installed centrifugal devices have doubled from 6000 to 13,000, 45 percent of them of models Advanced centrifugal devices IR-6.
The site continued, “As a result of this, Iran has enough time to produce enough high enriched uranium to make one bomb in less than a week. In addition, instead of reducing the risk of military confrontation, this risk has increased, which undermined the credibility of the US leadership. From the attack on Saudi Aramco facilities to shoot down US drones and missile strikes on American bases such as Ain al -Assad, the policy failed to deter more provocations and instead made it more likely. The American pressure also prompted Iran to approach China and Russia, which reduced Washington’s influence and holding its strategic priorities. The in -depth relations between Tehran, Beijing and Moscow include the transfer of weapons to Russia, which led to the prolongation of the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, China’s desire to buy Iranian oil undermines sanctions and erodes the credibility of the US leadership. At the same time, the Houthis in Yemen, who are closely related to Tehran, disrupted the routes in the Red Sea, which exaggerated global trade tensions.
Wrong assumptions
According to the site, “The other wrong assumption is that the sanctions would lead to a sufficient amount of internal disturbances to topple the system. But Iran’s experience over three different stages of sanctions undermines this logic. In the period from 1979 to 2009, the United States has mainly imposed preliminary sanctions, and has not caused severe damage. In the second stage (2010-2015), about 600 cases of large economic costs, but the limited damage to the well-being led to an ultimate compromise. The third round of the penalties, which coincided with the Kofid-19, caused great difficulties. The first two years of maximum pressure led to the shrinkage of the economy by 12%, inflation increased by 75%, and poverty increased by 8%. One of the main reasons behind the failure of sanctions in stimulating the internal revolution lies in the system of social care based on Iran, which isolates political influence groups from difficulties.
Iran’s flexibility
According to the site, “The Far pressure policy has strengthened the position of conservative Iranian militants, and undermined moderate reformists. By questioning the benefits of diplomacy, the militants pushed the strategy of “resistance” that focus on the “resistance economy”, expanding missile capabilities and regional deterrence while deepening relations with China and Russia. Recently, a new militant faction called for nuclear deterrence. However, this narration lost its momentum, especially after the overthrow of the lion in Syria. In response, moderate voices regained their momentum. ”
New opportunity
According to the website, “The newly -elected president, Masoud Boukhskian, won the presidential elections on the basis of promises of social reforms, economic resuscitation, and improving relations with the West. He now appears to be in a better position than former President Hassan Rouhani in 2017, and this is clear from the unprecedented parliamentary support for his government. In recent months, his administration has called for direct dialogue, not only on nuclear issues, but also about other American concerns. He realizes that without reducing sanctions, the Iranian economy has a little opportunity to achieve real prosperity. ”
The site continued, “But instead of approaching negotiations, it seems that the new American policy has returned to a position that reminds us of” No negotiations, no war “, which defined Trump’s first mandate. In fact, the possibility of achieving a serious diplomatic progress, or any penetration, is now more distant than ever. The United States, instead of narrowing the economic screws to break the system or incite the popular revolution, should review its theory and approach to dealing with sanctions, because providing concrete incentives that change the internal dynamics and encourage participation.